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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ETHEL M. GIBBONS,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.
OREM CI TY CORPORATION,
and GARY SCOTT CRAWFORD,
Defendants and Respondents

)
)
)
)
) Case No.
)
12476

)
)
)
)

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action to recover for
personal

injuries suffered by plaintiff

when an 0 rem City dump truck co 11 i ded
into her vehicle while she was making a

left-hand turn at the intersection of
State Street and 800 North in Orem City,
Utah.

This action was brought against

-1 -

the driver of the truck, an Orem City·
employee driving the dump truck in the
course of his employment, and against
Orem City under the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act Sections 63-30-1 through
63-30-34, Utah Code Annotated 1953.
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE
IN TRIAL COURT
The trial court after memorandums of·
law were submitted and after hearing
arguments granted defendants• motion
for summary judgment on the ground that
the evidence was conclusive as a matter
of law that the plaintiff Ethel M.
Gibbons was negligent and that her
negligence was a proximate contributing
cause of the collision and her resulting

i
~

injuries.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
-2-

Plaintiff-Appellant seeks reversal
and remand for an opportunity to present

her claim upon trial to a jury.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statement of facts is based upon
the records submitted to this court in the
case of Ethel M. Gibbons v. Orem City
Corporation· and Gary Scott Crawford and
Lynn Sorensen et al. v. Orem City and

Gary Scott Crawford.

Lynn Sorensen is

the son of Mrs. May Sorensen, a passenger
in the vehicle driven by Ethel M. Gibbons;
the two cases having been consolidated
for trial upon the motion of the defendants.
On October 7, 1968, Mrs. Ethel M.
Gibbons was driving south on State Street
in Orem City with her passenger'Mrs. May
Sorensen.

As she approached the intersection
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at 800 North, she stopped in the collecting,
inside lane, preparatory to making a left
turn toward Provo Canyon.

When the light

turned green, she proceeded into her turn.
When she was approximately two-thirds of
the way through the intersection, her car
was struck broadside by the dump truck
of defendant Orem City which was traveling

in a northerly direction on State Street.
The defendant 1 s truck skidded a distance
of about 61 feet before striking the

Gibbons vehicle and the impact killed the
passenger, May Sorensen, and seriously
injured the plaintiff, demolishing her
sma 11

car.
The area where the accident occurred

was in a business district (R. 157).
Mrs. Gibbons• car was the first one in

-4-

line waiting for the light to turn green,
when it turned green, she testified that
she looked to the south and to the east
and saw no traffic that would endanger
her (R. 141 and Dep. p. 8).
Measurements were taken by Officer
Nielson and Trooper Blackhurst (R. 143, 155).
From a sutdy of this information a physicis't,
Dr. Daniel

w.

Miles and Captain E. M.

Pitcher, each made studies (R. 178,
171).

These studies show that the dump

truck was traveling north at a rate of
between 40
Daniel

w.

~:ind

48 miles per hour.

Dr.

Miles also calculated that

Mrs. Gibbons• automobile was 64% through
the intersection when struck by the dump
truck.

When Mrs. Gibbons entered the

intersection, the truck was approximately
350 feet back from the intersection.

-5 -

A vehicle driven by one Boyd Erickson
was stopped on the opposite side of the

intersection in the inside lane.

The

Erickson vehicle in its position obscured
the dump truck, and when Mrs. Gibbons
looked to the south she could not see the
truck.
Defendant Crawford stated in his
affidavit:
I do not know my speed * ·k *
since the speedometer on the truck
registers from 40 to 60 miles per
hour at all times when the vehicle
is in motion*** I would guess
my speed to be well within the speed
limit. As I approached the intersection, the light changed from red
to green in my direction, and I
then looked in my rear view mirrors
to ascertain if there was any
traffic behind me. When I looked
forward again, a Ford was moving
directly into my lane of traffic
making a left turn onto 8th North
* * * I applied my brakes * * *
and slid into this vehicle*** I
11
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first detected the vehicle when I
was approximately 70 to 75 feet
from i t * * * There were automobiles
on either side of my truck and I
could neither move left nor
right. 11
(R. 57).
That night at the hospital where Mrs.
Gibbons was taken Mr. Crawford admitted
tc- the witness, Wallace Larson, he had
looked into
that

11

11

my rear view mi rrors_, 11 and

the s peedome te r reading in the truck

was less

than the actual speed of the

truck.

As a result of his, he stated

11

to me that he could be in trouble for
speeding.

He also said to me that as

1e approached the intersection there was
l ~ssenger

car to his left which was

llmost to the intersection. (R. 167, 177).
The truck skidded 61 feet 5 inches
1efore impact, and, locked to the Gibbons

-6a-

car, skidded another 28 feet 10 inche~
after impact.
11

Officer Nielson stated the

overal l or a total skid of the truck was

90 fee t 2 i n ch es

*

-1,

*

11

(

R• 15 6 ) •

M-r •

Crawford told Trooper Blackhurst, "the
brakes were not as good as they should
have been ;'(

-1, ;'( 11

(

R.

144).

The actual course of the skidding
truck and the skid marks are shown in
photographs taken of the accident, and
these photographs also show that Mr.
Crawford would be able to see out over
a passenger car such as the Erickson
vehicle (R.

166, 167).

A vehicle driven by Michael S.
Christensen was following plaintiff
two cars to the rear.

Mr. Christensen

also intended to make a left hand turn.

-7-

In his affidavit he stated that he saw
nothing in the intersection in the way of
traffic prior to hearing the screech of
the dump truck's brakes.

He stated that

the plaintiff was traveling from

5 to 10

miles per hour in making what he regarded
as a

11

normal left turn 11

(R. 142).

The plaintiff stated in her affidavit
that:
As I approached my left turn to go
east on 8th North, I looked into the
intersection. I saw no traffic or
vehicles in or approaching the
intersection that in my judgment
would interfere with my making the
l e f t t u r n . I neve r s aw th e t ruck
that hit me. My bl inker signal was
on for my left turn*** I waited
for the light to turn green for me,
and I then made a cautious left turn
feeling at the time there was no
danger in the intersection** * 11
11

(R. 141).

ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in granting

-8-

2.Qmmary judgment on the grounds that
~aintiff

was contributorily negligent

as a matter of law.
Rule S6(c) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure as applicable in the case at hand
provides as follows:
"The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
depositions and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law. 11
In order for the trial court to have
correctly granted summary judgment against
plaintiff, there must be no genuine issues
as to material facts.

It is the well

established rule that a summary judgment
can only be granted when under the facts
viewed in the 1 ight most favorable to the.
plaintiff, he has no right to recovery and

-9-

any doubts must be resolved in favor of

permitting him to go to trial.

This rule

has been stated in substance in numerous
Utah cases.

In Welchman v. Wood, 9 Utah

2nd 25, 337 P.2d 410 (1959), the court in
commenting upon when a summary judgment
should be granted said:
Summary judgment is a drastic
remedy and the Court should be
reluctant to deprive litigants of
an opportunity to fully present
their contention upon a trial.
It
should be granted only when under the
facts viewed in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff he could
not recover as a matter of law. 11
[Emphasis added].
11

A ft'A C-tJ//]JA

See also Housley v. Andecon Company,

19 Utah 2d 124, 427 P.2d 390 (1967);
Controll<':,.{_Receivables,

Inc. v. Harman, 17

Utah 2d 420, 413 P. 2d 807 ( 1 966) ; and

l.angren v.

Ingalls, 12 Utah 2d 388, 367

p. 2d l 7 9 ( 1 96 l ) •
-1 0-

In addition to the severity of summary
judgments and the reluctance of courts in
granting them, it is also a well established
rule that the court on appeal in reviewing
such judgments will consider all of the
facts presented and every inference
arising therefrom in a light most favorable
to the appealing party.

Abdul kadi r v.

Western Pacific Railroad Company, 7 Utah 2d
53, 318 P.2d 339 (1957) arose out of an
accident involving a speeding passenger
train which struck and killed a woman
eras sing the rail road tracks.

In addressing

itself to the issue of whether the
summary judgment from which the plaintiff
appealed was properly granted, the court
said:
The pertinent inquiry is whether
under any view of the facts, a
plaintiff could recover, It is
11

-l l -

acknowledged that in the face of
a motion for dismissal or summary
judgment, the plaintiff is entitled
to have the trial court, and this
court on review, consider all of the
evidence which plaintiff is able
to present, and every inference and
intendment fairly arising therefrom in the light most favorable
to him. 11 [Emphasis added] .
See also, Young v. Texas Company, 8
Utah 2nd 206, 331 P.2d 1099 (1958);
Morris v. Farnsworth Motel, 123 Utah 289,

259 P. 2d 297 ( 1953); and Auto Lease Company
v. Central Mutual

Insurance Company, 7 Utah

2nd 3 3 6, 3 25 P. 2d 264 ( l 95 8) .

The facts looked at in the record
most favorably for the plaintiff show
that the plaintiff was moving cautiously
through the intersection in a 1eft turn.
She did not see the dump truck because
it was about 350 feet down the road, and

was obstructed by the Erickson car.
-1 2-

The

dump truck was exceeding the speed limit
and was moving between 40 and 48 rn i l es per
hour.

The plaintiff was

64%

through the

intersection when hit by the truck.

She

states in her deposition that it was her
intention to make a left turn; that she
had her left turn signal working; when
the light turned

g~een,

she looked to the

east in the direction she was going to
go and that she looked to the south, the
direction from which the dump truck came.
(Dep. 7,

9, 19. Aff. R. 141).

The vehicle

cir i ven by Boyd Erickson was approaching
in the innermost lane of the northbound
traffic.

It is ambiguous from the record

whether Mrs. Gibbons saw the Erickson
vehicle approaching.

It is clear that

she did not see the Orem City dump truck.

-13-

Mrs. Gibbons testified in her deposition
as fo 11 ows :
"Question:
Did you see any vehicles
come into the intersection going
North which might interfere with
your path or the path your car was
going?
Answer:

did not.

Question:
Did you see the truck which
struck your car before the coll is ion
occurred?
Answer:

did not. 11

(p.

8).

A reading of the entire record on
appeal wi 11 show that Mrs. Gibbons has not
been asked directly whether she saw the
Erickson vehicle, but she was asked the
general question of whether she saw any

cars which would interfere with her making
a left-hand turn:
"Question:
From the time you started
your car until you had stopp~d for
the 1 ight and the light had changed
to green, from the time you started

-14-

your car, did you see any other cars
in the intersection at all until the
coll is ion occurred?
Answer: I never saw any that would
hinder my making the turn and going
through my lane of traffic.~
The affidavit of the witness Christensen
states that plaintiff was moving in her
left turn at the rate of 5 to 10 miles per
hour.

It was calculated by the physicist

Miles that she was 64% through the intersect'ion (R. 179), over 80 feet into the
intersection when she was hit broadside
by the dump truck.

The computation

was made th a t th e dump t ruck was a pp r ox i mately 350 feet from the intersection
at the time Mrs. Gibbons started her turn
(R. l 7 9 ) .

F r om these facts , i t can be

fairly inferred that when Mrs. Gibbons
looked to see if any vehicles were
approaching before she started her turn she
-15 -

could see no vehicles approaching that would
interfere with making the turn, and that
she exercised that degree of care which a
reasonable and prudent person would use
under the circumstances.

Michael

s.

Christensen stated in his affidavit (R. 142)
that the plaintiff's car was two cars ahead
of him; that he also was going to make a
left-hand turn, and that:
I was aw a re t hat th i s ca r i n the
lead had a green light and saw it
start and proceed into a left turn
and proceed on 8th North. To the best
of my recollection, this car was
traveling between five and ten miles
per hour as it made a left turn. I
was anxious to make the same light.
The next thing I remember was hearing
the screech of brakes and I saw the
on-coming dump truck and I knew it
was going to hit the car I have above
described.
I saw the collision. I
was unaware of any other traffic in
the intersection because my attention
was focused on the on-coming dump truck
that I could see was surely going to
hit the small car*** This car
(the plaintiff's) made a normal
11
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left turn without incident making
no impression on me until I heard
the screech of the brakes as above.
Prior to hearing the above screeching
noise, I saw nothing in the intersection which would indicate to me
that there might be an accident. 11
The courts have recognized that in tort
actions involving issues of negligence,
contributory negligence and causation,
the rule of granting summary judgment
only when there is no genuine issue as to
material facts is even more strictly applied
than in other cases such as contracts and
other situations where there is greater
ease in determining the factual

issues.

This rule was recognized in the case of
Singleton v. Alexander, 19 Utah 2nd 292,
431 P.2d 126 (1967) which arose out of
injuries sustained by the plaintiff in a
slip and fall accident in a laundromat.
In discussing the considerations involved
in granting summary judgment in tort actions

-1 7 -

the court said:

It will be noted that a summary judgment can be granted only when it is
shown that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that the
moving party also is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law under
those facts. The court cannot
consider the weight of testimony or
the creditability of witnesses in
considering a motion for summary
judgment. He simply determines
that there is no disputed issue of
material fact and that as a matter
of law, a party should prevail.
Summary judgment is more frequently
given in contract cases because of
greater ease in determining the
factual issues.
In tort claims
defendants frequently rely on
affirmative defenses of accord and
satisfaction, res judicata, collateral
estoppel, etc., and such defenses are
just as easy to establish as are
matters of contract. However, when it
comes to determining negligence,
contributory negligence, and causation,
courts are not in such a good position
to make a total determination for
here enters a prerogative of the jury
tomake a determination of its own,
and that is: Did the conduct of a
party measure up to that of the
11
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reasonable prudent man, and, if not,
was it a proximate cause of the
ha rm done? 11
In the Singleton case there was an
issue of whether the plaintiff was guilty
of contributory negligence in failing to
see the water on the floor in which she

slipped.
the

In addressing itself to this issue,

court said:
The question of contributory
negligence on the part of the
plaintiff is a matter for jury
determination in that the jury
might believe from the size of the
basket the plaintiff was carrying,
she would not be expected to see the
floor where she was walking and
especially where she had come along
the path sometime prior thereto
and found no impediment to her
travel . 11
11

The ambiguity of the facts in the
instant case; the testimony of Mrs. Gibbons
in her deposition, and the affidavit of Michael

S. Christensen and the
inferences fairly
)
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arising from these factual matters clearly
show that there is a dispute in the facts
and that the jury might find that Mrs.
Gibbons, from the facts considered in the
light most favorable to her, did exercise
that the degree of care required of a
reasonable and prudent person while making
a left-hand turn.
In the Singleton v. Alexander supra .. ,
case , the co u rt quoted 3 8 Am. J u r . ,
Negligence 345:
The right of a party in a negligence
action to have the jury pass upon the
question of 1 iabil ity becomes absolute
* * * when the proof discloses such a
state of facts, whether controverted
or not, that, in essaying to fix
res pons i bi 1 i ty for the injury or
damage, different minds may arrive
reasonably at different conclusions
or may disagree reasonably as to the
inferences to be drawn from the facts.
Thus*** where negligence may
11
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reasonably and legitimately be inferred from the evidence, it is for
the jury to say whether negligence
shall be so inferred. ***The
inferences to be drawn from the evidence
must be certain and incontrovertable
to be decided by the court; otherwise
they must be determined by the
j U ry ~'( -/( ~'(II
The defendants 1n their memorandum
to the court in support of their motion
for summary judgment alleged that the
plaintiff .was guilty of contributory
negligence in failing to yield the right
of way and in failing to keep a proper
lookout.

In her deposition, Mrs. Gibbons

stated that she did look to the south
before she made her turn and saw no
vehicles, which in her opinion, would
inrerfere with her making the turn.

A

jury might well find this testimony
establishes that she did make the necessary
observations required by a reasonable
-21 -

and prudent person.

Defendants also allege

that Mrs. Gibbons was contributorily negligent in failing to yield the right of
way to the dump truck.

However, it is

submitted, that the dump truck was 350
feet down the street when Mrs. Gibbons
looked to make her turn and that she
failed to see it and failed to see how fast
it wus approaching because the Erickson
vehicle obstructed her view.

Under these

circumstances, she did not fail to yield
the right·of way.
We submit that the instant case is a
classic example of what the court in the
Singleton v. Alexander, supra., case was
speaking of when it stated that the court
is not in as good a position to make a
total determination on issues of contributory
negligence, and that it is the prerogative
-22-

of the jury in considering the weight of

the testimony and the creditability of
witnesses to determine whether a party was,
in fact, contributorily negligent.

The

facts of this case when viewed in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff show that
she was not contributorily negligent as
a matter of law and the trial court erred
in granting summary judgment against the
plaintiff on that ground.
II

Whether plaintiff was contributorily
neqligent 1n failing to exercise the high
degree of care imposed by statute upon one
making a left-hand turn should be deter1

mined by the jury at trial and not on
2,llmmary judgment.

-23-

41-6-73 Utah Code Annotated 1953 as
amended in 1961 states:
A driver of a vehicle within an
intersection intending to turn to
the left shall yield the right of
way to any vehicle approaching
from the opposite direction which
is within the intersection or so
close thereto as to constitute an
immediate hazard, during the time
when such driver is moving within
the intersection. 11
11

Smith v. Gallegos, 16 Utah 2nd 344,
400 P.2d 570 (1965) is the landmark case
interpreting this amended statute.
case

invol~ed

That

a similar accident occuring

at 3500 South and Redwood Road in Salt
Lake City, which is a four-lane highway
including a left-hand turn lane.

The

plaintiff was in the left hand turn lane
and after beginning his turn was struck
by the defendant•s northbound truck.

-24-

The

evidence showed that the defendant had been
travel i ng on the inside lane going northwa rd and near the intersection he had pulled

into the outside lane section to pass other
cars.

The court noted that as other cars

on the inside lane would have been between
the defendant and the plaintiff as
plaintiff began his left-hand turn, the jury
could reasonably regard that fact as
supporting the testimony of the plaintiff
that he looked and saw no on-coming traffic
that presented any hazard to him in making
his turn.

The speed limit for the defendant

was forty miles an hour, and the court

found that there was evidence which could
show a speed on his part of forty to fortyfive miles per hour.
In holding that the trial court
correctly rejected the defendant's contention

-25 -

that the plaintiff should be held guilty of
contributory negligence as a matter of
law and properly presented the issues to
the jury for determination, the court
said:
Justice does not sanction any such
favoring of one party at the expense
of the other.
It imposes upon all
drivers, including not only the left
turner * * * but also the on-coming
vehicle * * * the fundamental duty
which pervades the entire law of
torts and from which no one is at any
time excused: to use that degree
of care which a reasonable and
prudent person would use under the
circumstances for the safety of himself and others. Notwithstanding the
onerous duty now imposed on the left
turner by this new statute, he is
entitled to assume that other drivers
will also be conforming to the
requirements of law, by keeping a
proper lookout and control over their
cars and by using reasonable care
for the safety of themselves and others.
If the left turner in performing his
duty, and making the required observation, sees no vehicle approaching,
or that any coming is far enough
away so that he can reasonably believe
11
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that he has time to make his turn,
he may proceed. 11 [Emphasis added].

~

The facts of the instant case are
virtual iy identical to those in the Smith
v. Gallegos case.

Mrs. Gibbons stated

in her deposition that she looked south and
saw no on-coming traffic which would hinder
her when she commenced her turn.

When she

was struck by the dump truck, she was over
eighty feet into the turn which was about
~a-thirds

section.

of the way through the interIf the dump truck was traveling

at a speed of forty-five miles per hour,
as the exper~ witness Miles calculated,
I

placing it 350 feet down the road when
Mrs. Gibbons commenced her turn, the
Erickson vehicle would have been between
Mrs. Gibbons' car and the dump truck, thus
preventing her from seeing it speeding

-27-

toward the intersection.

The posted speed

limit for the defendant was 40 miles per
hour but he was in a business district and
he volunteered the statement to witness
Wallace Larsen that he might be in trouble
for speeding (R. 176).
Hardman v. Thurman, et al., 121 Utah
143, 239 P.2d 215 (1951) is another similar
case involving a left-hand turn accident
at 21st South and State Street in Salt Lake
City.

The plaintiff driver was going south·

on State Street intending to turn east
onto 21st South.

When the light turned

green, she remained stopped momentarily
to permit northbound traffic to proceed
through the intersection.

There was an

oil tanker in the first lane east of the
center of the street stopped at the south

-28-

side of the intersection signaling to make
a l e f t hand t u r n to the we s t.

A ca r i n

the second lane east of the center of the
street proceeding north had stopped to
permit the plaintiff to proceed eastward.
The plaintiff observed no cars in the third
lane to the east, but as she reached that
lane, a trailer truck operated by the defendant col l i ded in to the right side of
the plaintiff's vehicle.

There were

estimated speeds of the defendant's vehicle
ranging from twenty to forty-two.miles per
hour.

The prima facie speed limit governing

the defendant was forty mil es per hour.
The court held that the trial court was
correct in denying the defendant's motion
for a directed verdict on the grounds that
the plaintiff was contributorily negligent

29-

as a matter of law.

The court pointed out

th a t i n c r o s s i n g the f i rs t two l an es of
traffic, the plaintiff might well have
been unable to see the defendant 1 s vehicle
since it would have been some distance
south of the intersection
started to turn.

when she first

The court also pointed

out that the oil tanker and other vehicles
could have obstructed her vision and that
under these circumstances, the

jury could

reasona?ly find that she had exercised due
care in making the turn.
We submit that the plaintiff in the
instant case is entitled to have her day
in court and that indeed the facts show
th a t a j u r y co u l d f i n d s he d i d ex e r c i s e
the high degree of care imposed upon one

-30-

ma k i ng a l e f t - ha n d t u rn .

CONCLUSION
The plaintiff sustained very substantial
personal

injuries when two-thirds of the

way th rough a left -hand turn her car was
struck broadside by a speeding dump
truck.

There are critical factual

which are in dispute.

issues

A reading of the

entire re co rd before the court in a l i ght
most favorable to the plaintiff will show
that a jury could find that she did fulfill
the duty imposed upon one making a left
hand turn.
The trial court committed error in
granting summary judgment against the
plaintiff on the grounds that she was
~ntributorily negligent as a matter of
1

l aw •

p l a i n t i ff i s en t i t l e d to have he r

-31 -

case tried before a jury and this matter

should be remanded to the trial court
for that purpose.
Respectfully submitted,

W. C. LAMOREAUX
B. L. DART , JR.
ROBERT B. GOICOECHEA
340 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 8411·
Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Appellant
-
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